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Do Relations Individuate? 
by J. w .  MEILAND 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
"VVuaT is it that renders two exactly similar material objects numerically dif- 
ferent from one another? One possible answer to this question is that the two 
objects have different relational properties or stand in different relations. 
They stand in different spatial relations to some other material objects and, 
perhaps, to one another. For example, one object X may be to the left of the 
other, Y (this relation hereafter being called "Relation L"), while Y is to 
the right of X. E. B. Allaire rejects this answer on the grounds that X and Y 
first must be numerically different before they can stand in Relation L: "Re- 
lations-I 'll  stick with spatial ones--presuppose numerical difference; they 
do not account for it. The thisness and the thatness of things is presupposed 
in saying that the one is to the left of the other. 'u Allaire's own answer to 
the question stated above is that each of the two numerically different ma- 
terial objects contains a different "bare particular" (a particular of this sort 
being called "bare" because it itself has no properties) : "Bare particulars are, 
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therefore, the entities in things accounting for the numerical difference of 
things. ''2 1 wish to show that the theory of bare particulars is highly implausi- 
ble and that relations do individuate material objects. 
I 
What  is Allaire's argument for the claim that "relations presuppose nu- 
merical difference?" He says that if this were not so, "then in at least some 
cases we would be forced to say what we all know to. be false; namely, that 
the same thing is to the left of itself. ''3 But perhaps saying that the same 
thing is to the left of itself is false just because Relation L does individuate-- 
that is, just because if X and Y stand in Relation L to one another, then it is 
logically impossible for X and Y to be numerically identical. Perhaps that X 
and Y stand in Relation L is a logically sufficient condition of the numerical 
difference of X and Y. If so, then standing in that relation would by itself 
guarantee that the terms of the relation are numerically different; and thus 
bare particulars would not be required to account for this difference. 
Allaire denies that standing in Relation L is a logically sufficient condition 
of numerical difference. He admits that Relation L "cannot be exemplified 
by one thing." But he says: "That L is asymmetrical is factual, not logical. TM 
Since asymmetry implies irreflexivity, Allaire is claiming that it is a factual 
matter, not a logical truth, that Relation L is irreflexive. He does not give 
any argument for this claim. But this claim is crucial to the plausibility of 
this theory of bare particulars, as I now wish to show. 
If it is merely a factual matter that Relation L cannot be exemplified by 
one thing, then it is logically possible that it be exemplified by one thing. Let 
us suppose that we are observing a case of what we would describe as "one 
material object X being to the left of another, Y." Since on the theory of 
bare particulars, objects contain bare particulars, Allaire would say that if 
this is in fact a case involving two different objects, then there is one bare 
particular in the location occupied by X and a different bare particular in the 
location occupied by Y. But, if Allaire is correct about Relation L, it is logi- 
cally possible that this case is not a case involving two different objects, X 
and Y, even though in every observable respect this case is just like a case 
involving two different objects. That is, it is logically possible that the nu- 
mericalIy same bare particular occupies two different locations (those which, 
as we say, are occupied by X and Y). So in claiming that the irreflexivity of 
Relation L is factual, not logical, Allaire is claiming that the numerically 
same bare particular can occupy two different locations. But there is no way 
to determine, in a case of the sort described above, whether the two locations 
are occupied by different bare particulars or by the same bare particular, for 
what is observed is the same in either case. Hence, if Allaire is correct, there 
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is no way to determine whether such a case is a case of numerical difference 
or of numerical identity. That X and Y occupy different locations does not 
settle the matter, if Allaire is correct, since those different locations may be 
occupied by the same bare particular. 
But then what basis could anyone have for asserting that in a case of the 
sort described above, X and Y are numerically different or that they are nu- 
merically the same? One could not even have an inductive basis for such as- 
sertions. For to have an inductive basis for this, one would have to have found 
that in some previous cases of objects that occupy different locations, those 
objects were numerically different (or identical). But in order to acquire 
such inductive evidence, we would first have to possess a way of determining 
whether a given case is a case of numerical identity or of numerical differ- 
ence. 
Since there could be no basis for saying, with certainty or with probability, 
that two exactly similar material objects are numerically identical or numeri- 
cally different, one could never know, in a given case, how many bare par- 
ticulars are present. So the theory of bare particulars provides an account of 
the numerical differences of things at the price of making it impossible for us 
to determine whether or not a given case is a case of numerical difference. 
Thus, if the theory of bare particulars is correct, it can never be employed in 
a particular case. The only reason that Allaire gives for supposing that there 
are bare particulars is that they are required to "account for the numerical 
difference of things." But if the theory of bare particulars is correct, then no 
cases could be known to exist for which it was needed to account. For al- 
though bare particulars are supposed to explain numerical difference rather 
than provide a criterion for detecting numerical difference, the existence of 
bare particulars would seem to eliminate the possibility of having any cri- 
terion for detecting numerical difference in cases of two bodies that have 
exactly the same properties (other than spatial properties). 
It is true that one could still say: "If this particular case is a case of numeri- 
cal difference, then it is a case involving two different bare particulars." But 
is to say that two different bare particulars are present in such a case to say 
anything more than that it is a case of numerical difference? And if it is not 
to say anything more than this, then in what sense does saying that different 
bare particulars are present account for numerical difference? 
Gould Allaire say that the irreflexivity of Relation L is logical rather than 
factual? To do so would meet the objections above. But to do so would also 
allow relations to individuate. For then standing in Relation L would by 
itseJf, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of bare particulars, guarantee 
numerical difference. Objects would be numerically different solely in virtue 
of standing in Relation L. And then there would be no need to postulate the 
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existence of bare particulars. Numerical difference could be accounted for 
by citing the relations in which the objects in question stand. 
II  
There are two sorts of situations which involve numerical identity or dif- 
ference. The first concerns objects existing at a given moment; the second 
concerns objects existing at different moments. As a situation of the first 
sort, let us suppose that two exactly similar objects X and Y coexist but 
occupy different locations. If it is only factually the case, rather than logically 
necessary, that X and Y are numerically different, then it is logically possible 
that exactly similar objects which occupy different locations are numerically 
identical. But then what would it mean to say of such objects that they are 
numerically identical? If we do not employ a theory of substance as sub- 
stratum or a theory of bare particulars, there seems to be nothing that could 
be meant by saying that they are numerically identical; if it is only factually 
the case that X and Y are numerically identical, then a situation that is 
exactly the same as the described situation in every observable respect could 
be a situation involving numerical differenceof objects. So unless we say that 
ascriptions of numerical identity and difference in situations of this first sort 
are about something unobservable (a substratum or bare particulars), we 
must say either (i) that ascription of numerical identity or difference in 
situations of this first sort has no meaning, or else (ii) that what it means to 
say that two exactly similar objects are numerically different is that they 
occupy different locations. That is, in order to provide a meaning for such 
ascriptions without referring to something unobservable, we must deny that 
it is a merely factual matter that objects occupying different locations are 
numerically different. We must say that "occupying different locations" is 
what the expression 'numerically different' means in such a situation. Only 
in this way will it not be a merely factual matter that objects occupying dif- 
ferent locations are numerically different. And hence only in this way will the 
expression 'numerically different' have a meaning in the first type of situation 
without invoking something unobservable. 
In every situation of the first sort--that is, situations involving coexisting 
material bodies--two such bodies are numerically different if and only if (or 
when and only when) they occupy different locations. The meaning of the 
expression 'numerically different' is "occupying different locations." But the 
following objection might be raised to this position: 
This position on the meaning of 'numerically different' is satisfactory only 
if we consider only the first sort of ease. Let us now consider situations in 
which the two entities in question do not coexist. We  often say that what 
I am now observing (call this "X") is numerically different from what I 
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previously observed (call this "Y"). Yet what I now observe can be both 
exactly similar to and in the same location as what I previously observed, 
even though the two things are numerically different. Therefore the expres- 
sion 'X is numerically different from Y' cannot mean "X and Y occupy 
different locations," unless the expression 'numerically different' is equivocal, 
that is, unless it has one meaning in the first sort of situation and a different 
meaning in the second sort of situation. 
What  this objection shows is that we must add to the expression which 
renders the meaning of 'numerically different': "Two objects are numerically 
different (a) if they coexist, then when and only when they occupy different 
locations, or (b) in case they in fact never coexist, if and only if they would 
have occupied different locations had they coexisted." But to make the addi- 
tion represented by part (b) is only to add further specification concerning 
the locations of bodies. It is not to mention something unobservable which 
is said to be contained within material objects. It seems, then, that a sub- 
stratum or bare particulars need not be postulated if the expression 'numeri- 
cal difference' has the meaning suggested above. But if it has the suggested 
meaning, then relations do individuate. For then X and Y are numerically 
different when and only when they have or would have had different loca- 
tions, that is, when and only when they have or would have had different 
spatial relations to other bodies, 
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Scriven on Human Unpredictability 
by DAVID K. LEWIS and JANE SHELBY RICHARDSON 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
IN ms paper "An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior, ''1 Michael 
Scriven offers an argument intended to show that it is impossible in principle 
to predict what a person (or indeed a suitable robot) will do in a certain 
